Addressing endogeneity in the causal relationship between sustainability and financial performance by Soytas, Mehmet Ali et al.
Supply Chain Management Publications Supply Chain Management 
4-2019 
Addressing endogeneity in the causal relationship between 
sustainability and financial performance 
Mehmet Ali Soytas 
Özyeğin University Sustainability Platform 
Meltem Denizel 
Iowa State University, mdenizel@iastate.edu 
Damla D. Usar 
Özyeğin University Sustainability Platform 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/scm_pubs 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, Operations 
and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons 
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
scm_pubs/92. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Supply Chain Management at Iowa State University 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supply Chain Management Publications by an authorized 
administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Addressing endogeneity in the causal relationship between sustainability and 
financial performance 
Abstract 
The existing empirical literature on the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and 
corporate financial performance casts doubt on the direction of this relationship although more studies 
point out a direction from sustainability to performance. Literature also presents a gap in addressing the 
mechanism(s) of the relationship that hinders the convergence of the empirical findings and only recently 
the question of causality is being addressed with modern econometric techniques. We argue that due to 
the potential endogeneity problem in the relationship, an empirical strategy without a theoretical base 
may result in inconclusive or misleading conclusions. We address the potential endogeneity problem in 
the relationship and identify the possible causes of this endogeneity as: (i) firm level heterogeneity in 
financial returns, (ii) the relationship between firm's productivity level and the marginal cost of 
sustainability initiatives, and (iii) measurement error. We implement Instrumental Variable (IV) technique 
to overcome these biases. Our results present empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that 
corporate sustainability is positively related (possibly causally) with corporate financial performance. We 
further find that sustainability initiatives are more costly for companies that are more productive; thus, 
they have less incentive to invest. Finally, measurement error in the sustainability metrics does not play a 
crucial role. 
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The empirical literature considers firm specific aspects affecting corporate sustainability decisions but 
generally omits the influence of the competition. We advocate that sustainability actions of a company 
impact its marketplace and vice versa. Therefore, the sustainability return of the single firm is a function 
of the other firms’ sustainability decisions.  We approach sustainability decisions as strategic decisions 
and evaluate the effect of competition and spillovers in a static market entry game. We estimate the 
parameters of the discrete choice model using the social performance ratings from MSCI KLD 400 
Social Index as proxy for sustainability decisions and financial information from Wharton Research 
Data Services’ COMPUSTAT dataset. When strategic interaction is not accounted for, we find that 
the increasing number of competitors increases the likelihood of sustainability investments, 
seemingly shows the spillover effect dominates the competition. When we apply the multi – 
stage approach, which incorporates competitive interaction, we provide empirical evidence that 
the effect of competition on the likelihood of entry into the sustainability market dominates the effect of 
spillover. We find that strategic motives, typically ignored in the empirical literature, appear to be an 
important factor in understanding sustainability related decisions.  
1. Introduction 
Strategic interaction of firms in their production and management decisions have attracted 
increasing interest from the operations management and production research literature in the 
last two decades. Cooperative strategic interactions among supply chain partners increases 
collaboration and coordination within the supply chain i.e. supply networks and eliminates 
suboptimal outcomes for all parties involved (Wei,  Zhao, and Hou 2019; Leng and Jiang 2018; 
Yoon, Rosales, and Talluri 2018; Nair, Jayaram and Das 2015; Sofitra, Takahashi, and 
Morikawa 2015; Yang et al. 2015; von Massow and Canbolat 2014; Schoenherr, Griffith, and 
Chandra 2014; Shen and Yu 2012; Vanpoucke and Vereecke 2010; Lawson et al. 2009). Non-
cooperative strategic interactions among competing firms can affect market decisions of the 
focal company such as production quantity (e.g. Huang et al. 2020; Yang and Hsieh 2020; Ho 
2018; Huang and Xie 2015; Zhou, Karmarkar, and Jiang 2015), product price (Chen et al. 2020, 
Kim, Rhim, and Yang 2020; Yang and Hsieh 2020; Du et al. 2018; Jayaswal and Jewkes 2016), 
quality (Huang et al. 2020; Kim, Rhim, and Yang 2020; Bae, Yoo, and Sarkis 2010) and 
operational decisions such as procurement strategy (Xing, Zhu, and Zhao 2019; He, Huang and 
Yuan 2016; Zhou, Karmarkar, and Jiang 2015; Prince, Geunes, and Smith 2013), outsourcing 
(Gupta, He, and Sethi  2015; Bae et al. 2010), and lead time (Jayaswal and Jewkes, 2016). 
More recently, production research literature paid attention to sustainable development and its 
implications for the firms, which is conceptualized as corporate sustainability in the related 
literature. Environmental, social, and economic dimensions of sustainable development 
reflected in a business framework originated the term triple bottom line (Elkington 1998). 
Companies can achieve sustainable development to the extent that they can satisfy 
environmental quality, social justice, and profitability simultaneously according to this view 
(Jeurissen 2000). To achieve the triple bottom line, companies undertake several sustainability 
initiatives, examples of which include corporate social responsibility projects, improvement of 
work conditions, occupational health and safety management, product design for environment, 
responsible sourcing and conservation of natural resources, energy and greenhouse gases 
reduction and pollution reduction (Hitchcock and Willard 2009).  
Production Research literature has been concerned with specific and predominantly 
environmental objectives such as: remanufacturing (Gong et al. 2020; Kazancoglu and Ozkan-
Ozen 2020; Kenger, Koç, and Özceylan 2020; Lechner and Reimann 2020; Qian et al. 2020; 
Ray 2020; Wang et al. 2020; Yanıkoğlu and Denizel 2020; Huang et al. 2019; Huang and Wang 
2019; Sun et al. 2017) and closed loop supply chains (Reddy and Kumar 2020; Zhang, Xu and 
Chen 2020; Yuan et al. 2015; Lehr, Thun, and Milling  2013), waste management (Ramesh and 
Kodali 2012; Le Hesran et al. 2019), scrap management (Carmignani2017) and circular 
economy (Howard, Hopkinson,  and Miemczyk 201; Bressanelli, Perona, and Saccani 201; 
Batista  et al. 2019), energy management in production and logistics (Zhang et al. 2020; Nouiri, 
Bekrar, and Trentesaux 2019; Hahn-Woernle and Günthner 2018; Aghelinejad, Ouazene, and 
Yalaoui 2018), renewable energy usage (Mafakheri, Adebanjo, and Genus 2020), green 
logistics (Goswami et al. 2020) and supplier selection (Goswami and Ghadge 2020), green 
product (Keivanpour and Kadi 2018) and packaging design (White, Wang, and Li 2015), which 
can be categorized under the general sustainability umbrella. 
Besides the competitive cost advantages of adopting green supply chain practices (Cristmann 
2000; Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky 2008; Schoenherr and Talluri, 2013), companies also 
improve in terms of efficiency and innovation (Kumar, Teichman, and Timpernagel 2012). 
Especially activities targeting environmental sustainability such as minimizing energy and 
water consumption in production, decreasing resource consumption and producing less waste 
agree with Lean Principles1. Synergies between lean manufacturing and environmental 
management practices help improve operational performance (Yang, Hong, and Modi 2011). 
Similar to environmental performance, social sustainability performance impacts operational 
efficiency positively. Better workforce management and improvement in working conditions 
foster health and safety of employees and lead to higher motivation, increased organizational 
learning, lower absenteeism and attrition rates, more efficient processes and a productive 
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working environment (Chiswick 1986; Waddock and Graves 1997).  Sustainability efforts lead 
to operational efficiency and vice versa, leading to competitive advantage and subsequent 
financial returns in the long term (Zhu and Sarkis 2004).  Apart from internal drivers of 
sustainability such as productivity increase and cost reduction (Mathiyazhagan, Govindan, and 
Haq 2014), Kumar, Teichman, and Timpernagel (2012) regard external drivers such as 
stakeholders and competition and advocate that companies need to adopt sustainable initiatives 
in all upstream and downstream areas of its supply chain. Detailed literature reviews on 
sustainable supply chain management are provided in Taticchi et al. (2015) and Sarkis and Zhu 
(2018).  
Both papers call for expanding the scope of sustainability research. Taticchi et al. (2015) notes 
that production research literature has developed decision aid systems for sustainable supply 
chains at tactical and operational level, yet the economic aspects of industrial sustainability at 
a more strategic level have been neglected. As Dolgui, Ivanov, and Sokolov (2020) point out, 
supply chains have become intertwined and an upstream supplier can be both a supplier and a 
competitor to the focal company adding to the complexity of modeling strategic interactions 
between the firms. Although the interplay of regulatory decisions made by legal authorities and 
managerial decision-making in firms has received attention by the production research 
community, there remains a gap regarding the competitive factors and the possibility of 
strategic interactions between the firms for their sustainability decisions.  
In this paper, we address the influence of competitors’ sustainability decisions on the focal 
firm’s sustainability initiatives, aiming to help fill this gap by addressing sustainability related 
decisions of companies as strategic interactions in their respective markets. The focal 
company’s sustainability decision will consider the sustainability decision of the competitor in 
a game theoretic setting. The focal company may be positively or negatively affected by the 
competition depending on the competition level and the spillover rate in the market (Uşar, 
Denizel, and Soytaş 2020), therefore it needs to add the effects of fierce competition in its 
decision making process; i.e. might consider differentiating  on sustainable practices, adopt 
strategies to become superior or competent, and particularly in what kind of sustainable actions 
(Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero 2002; Cheng, Ioannou, and Sefafeim 2014). Ultimately, 
we estimate an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on the firm’s 
sustainability decision.  
Various databases such as: MSCI KLD 400 Social Index dataset2, CSRHUB3, GRI (Global 
Reporting Initiative)4, Dow Jones Sustainability Index5 are widely used for the sustainability 
ratings of the firms. For instance, MSCI KLD rates companies based on indicators that concern 
production research such as emissions and waste, packaging materials and waste, raw material 
sourcing, energy efficiency, union relations, employee health and safety, employee 
involvement, supply chain labor standards, labor rights, product quality and safety among 
others6. It is expected that the existence of these ratings and their impacts on various 
stakeholders lead to a sustainability competition between firms. To incorporate competition 
through strategic interactions, we built a novel model with the firm sustainability activities 
incorporated as a market entry game. In this setup, single firm’s entrance (which in our case 
refers to the situation that the firm performs considerable amount of sustainability related 
activities) to the sustainability market (which we will refer to the ‘competitive' environment 
that can award or penalize firms according to whether or not they take sustainable actions) is 
highly valued by the stakeholders: it can reduce production cost, improve workplace 
productivity, and potentially increases the financial returns (if the returns to sustainability is 
positive). But the firm’s collection of the returns from the sustainability efforts depends on 







whether the competitor/fellow firms also took same/similar or different sustainable actions. 
Therefore, the sustainability return of the single firm is a function of the other firms’ 
sustainability decisions. Or in the language of the market entry literature, a single firm’s entry 
decision to the sustainability market is a function of the entry decisions of the other firms. Our 
results emphasize the importance of measuring the level of competition in the market for 
sustainability, as direct effect of competition influences the firms’ net benefits negatively, but 
competition might also create gains in terms of spillovers. To state clearly, the likelihood of 
undertaking more sustainability initiatives is related negatively to the level of competition in 
the industry, whereas it is influenced positively by sustainability spillovers7. To separate these 
effects in estimation can be a challenging task. This paper addresses this challenge by 
employing a three-step estimation procedure that incorporates the competitors’ reactions to the 
focal firm’s entry decision as probabilistic outcomes which are obtained from the market entry 
game (Bajari et al. 2010). 
Our paper significantly contributes to both production research theory and practice. Indeed, it 
fills the content gaps depicting a detailed picture of the effect of competitors’ sustainability 
decisions on the focal company’s sustainability decision. Moreover, it presents a strategic 
interaction framework that encompasses both the positive effect of spillovers and negative 
effect of competition. The results and discussions can help practitioners in understanding the 
barriers and anticipating the effects of competition to adoption of sustainability practices. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief theoretical base on the 
sustainability adoption. Section 3 lays out the estimation framework and introduces the 
econometric model which allows the sustainability decisions to be interdependent among the 
                                                          
7 For instance, an estimation that does not take this endogeneity into account, will likely obtain a positive 
coefficient for the cumulative effect. That if interpreted as the effect of competition will lead to incorrect 
conclusions about the effect of competition. 
firms. Section 4 describes the dataset and the variables. Section 5 discusses the results and their 
implications. Section 6 concludes with future research opportunities. 
2. Theory and Main Hypothesis 
Companies have diverse motivations for adopting sustainability initiatives such as moral or 
value–based motivations, legitimacy concerns, managerial–agency–based motivation, 
institutional motivations, responsiveness to activists and strategic motivations (Caroll et al. 
2016). In our opinion sustainability decisions are mostly driven by strategic motivations. 
Companies that observe their competitors obtain positive returns by undertaking sustainability 
initiatives are inclined to invest in sustainability to exploit the producer surplus as well. Thus, 
the remaining companies are likely to invest in sustainability to be able to compete with the 
sustainability pioneers.  It is safe to presume that sustainability initiatives are like other 
innovations and at some future time, the majority of the companies operating in a particular 
industry will decide to invest in sustainability.  
Sustainability research has delivered not only anecdotal evidence but also empirical 
evidence on diffusion of sustainability practices. In his Harvard Business Review article Unruh 
(2010) presents anecdotal evidence of companies investing in sustainability because industry 
peers already invested in sustainability and names industry–wide sustainability pressures as the 
green domino effect. (Unruh 2010). Matisoff (2015) claims that the sustainability behavior of 
industry leaders changes the sustainability behavior of followers for the better and draws 
attention to the evidence supporting dissemination of best practices across the industry in the 
sustainability literature. The general upward trend for the MSCI KLD scores of S&P 
500/Domini firms documented by Carroll, Primo, and Richter (2016) supports the same view. 
In goods markets both revenues and costs decrease if more competitors adopt the same 
pricing strategy (Ellickson and Misra 2012). On the one hand, with increased sustainability 
competition a decrease in revenues may be expected, which in turn will decrease the likelihood 
of investing in sustainability. As more companies adopt sustainability initiatives, companies 
which are not sustainable will not be capable to compete with their sustainable counterparts. 
With sustainability becoming the norm, even more companies invest in sustainability. 
However, with more companies offering sustainability, consumers will be reluctant to pay a 
price premium for a sustainable product or choose a brand/product over a competing 
brand/product because of their sustainability. The value stakeholders assign to sustainability 
will decrease if almost all firms supply sustainability and the demand for sustainability will not 
suffice, which will reflect negatively on sustainability revenues. On the other hand, increased 
sustainability competition may increase revenues due to spillovers. If the sustainability efforts 
of a company lead to an improved stakeholder perception of the whole industry, the total market 
revenue may increase and companies which did not invest in sustainability may benefit from 
increased total market revenue. Company i free rides the sustainability efforts of company j and 
may even gain the second mover advantage if consumers do not differentiate between 
companies due to homogeneous goods assumption.  
Spillovers not only occur in form of increased revenues but also as decreased costs. 
Similar to pricing strategy cost of sustainability might decrease if more competitors adopt the 
same sustainability initiatives. If a company imitates the competitors’ sustainability initiatives, 
the initial implementation cost for that company will be lower compared to the competitors’ 
costs. The follower gains second mover advantage without bearing the full cost of the 
investments and the company free rides the sustainability efforts of her competitors. 
When firms make their entry decisions sequentially, it is well known that early movers 
can preempt subsequent potential entrants (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991a;1991b). However, the 
newcomers not only suffer from market entry barriers in the form of incumbent firms’ 
forestalling the entry of new competitors but also due to resistance within the company. 
Birkinshaw and Ridderstrale (1999) propose the corporate immune system as an analogy to 
model the resistance to advancement of creation–oriented activities such as sustainability 
initiatives. Similarly, to the immune system acting to prevent alien substances from affecting 
the body in a harmful way, existing power bases within the company view new initiatives as 
harmful. Furthermore, Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) document that established 
companies lag in adapting sustainability initiatives which can be beneficial in the long run and 
debate whether the cause is corporate inertia8. 
Fernandez- Kranz and Santalo (2010) study the effect of product market competition on 
corporate sustainability. They estimate the effect of market concentration on sustainability 
performance by controlling industry, firm size, financial performance, R&D intensity and 
advertisement intensity and present empirical evidence that firms in highly competitive markets 
are more socially responsible. These results are supporting the strategic view of sustainability, 
which regards sustainability as another differentiation strategy implemented for increasing 
financial return. Meng et al. (2016) estimate whether firm market power and the competition 
intensity in the industry affect the probability that companies implement sustainability and find 
a curvilinear relationship between product market competition and corporate sustainability. Too 
little or too much competition in the industry has negative impact on the likelihood of 
companies acting environmentally and socially responsible, while the former has less incentive 
to differentiate themselves from weak competition, while the latter face strong financial 
pressure and have fewer slack resources to implement sustainability practices. Dupire and M’ 
Zali (2018) empirically show that competition causes more involvement in corporate 
sustainability, however they also observe that companies under competitive pressure undertake 
more positive actions toward core stakeholders (consumers and employees) rather than 
peripheral stakeholders (community and environment). Furthermore, they document that this 
observation is more pronounced in B2C industries. 
                                                          
8 Corporate inertia is a term used to describe established companies’ lag in adapting business models, operating 
conditions, and making strategic decisions which can be beneficial in the long run. 
Most of the aforementioned papers are concerned with the effect of product market 
competition on sustainability. The literature has not reached a consensus whether competition 
fosters or hinders adoption of sustainability and consequent financial return although more 
studies point out a positive effect. Especially, the circumstances affecting sustainability 
decisions at strategic level and their financial return are still ambiguous.   
There has been a growing literature in in economics starting from early 1990s. 
Specifically following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a; 1991b), characterization of the discrete 
game as a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the 
actions of other players, opened up the possibility of applied research in this field. Strategic 
interactions in different problem settings such as market entry (Berry 1992; Gallant, Han, and 
Khawaja 2018; Tan 2019), labor force participation (Björn and Vuong 1984; Keane and Wolpin 
1997), long–term care and family bargaining (Stern and Heidemann 1999) auctions (Bajari and 
Hortacsu 2003; Athey, Levin, and Seira 2008), technology adoption (Ryan and Tucker 2012) 
has been addressed as discrete games.  
Whether to model sustainability interactions as a static or a dynamic process, depends 
both on theoretical and practical applicability.  The past decisions of the firms can be (and are) 
important determinants of the current decisions. However, this dependence itself does not 
necessarily qualify for a path to model the process as a dynamic process. In the dynamic entry 
game the firms should be modelled as maximizing the discounted sum of profits, taking into 
account each firm’s market entry decision now and in the future. 9 Yet, still, the static entry 
model can validate or refute consistently the importance of other players’ actions regarding the 
sustainability decision of the firm. We draw parallels with the research stream of market entry 
                                                          
9 More recent papers such as Gallant, Han, and Khawaja (2018) and Tan (2019) estimate a dynamic game of entry 
decisions of moderate number of entrants with spillover effects in Pharma industry. Similar dynamic setting can 
be applied to strategic interactions in sustainability market. However, the computational burden and data 
requirements caused by the large number of entrants in the dynamic version of the sustainability market entry 
game is a challenge that needs to be solved. Thus, this remains for future research. 
 
and technology adoption models and adapt the framework by Bajari et. al (2010) to the 
sustainability context.  
 
3. The Estimation Framework  
Sustainability decisions are strategic decisions which can be approached as discrete choices and 
should involve the consideration of demand, cost, and the competitive factors. The 
interrelatedness of firm decisions and the game theoretic nature of the framework complicate 
the discrete choice estimation (Draganska et al. 2008). The nested fixed – point method has 
been widely used in the estimation of discrete choice models in the context of static games (see, 
e.g., Seim 2006; Orhun 2013). However, the key econometric problem is that there is at least 
one fixed point (equilibrium), which must be solved at each iteration of the likelihood 
estimation. Moreover, if there is more than one fixed point, an equilibrium selection rule has to 
be prescribed. Due to computational cost of the nested fixed–point algorithm, alternative 
methods have been developed, such as the two–step approach of Hotz and Miller (1993) and 
Bajari et al. (2010), which we will adapt to estimate the strategic sustainability interactions.  
The estimation framework is based on the following idea. Since the equilibrium of 
sustainability decisions depends on the observable state variables, in the first stage the 
competitive effects (strategic interactions) are not incorporated into the estimation and firms’ 
choices are modeled as a function of observable state variables. Thereby consistent estimates 
of the probabilities are obtained. These first–stage probabilities are estimates of the beliefs that 
companies have about their competitors’ actions. The recovered probabilities are then plugged 
into a multi—stage model which incorporates strategic interactions.  
In the model proposed by Bajari et al. (2010), a company obtains zero net benefit if it 
chooses not to enter the market. This might be a reasonable assumption for new market entries 
and it is well known that the effect of entering into a market can be identified only relative to 
not entering in the estimation of market entry games (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991a). In our 
setting, however, the company still obtains net benefits if it chooses not to enter the 
sustainability market, since it will continue to operate in its primary line of business. The non–
adopter operates in the primary line of business and the decision of the competitor on 
sustainability can affect the non–adopters’ return negatively as well as positively. A company, 
which chooses not to enter the market, is still affected by the actions of its competitors. 
Ideally, the model should be able to identify the level of sustainability influence on net 
benefits separately. However, empirically we will not be able to identify the net benefits from 
adopting sustainable practices and the net benefits from not adopting sustainable practices 
separately. We can only identify the difference between the net benefit of investing in 
sustainable practices as opposed to not investing and recover the difference  nonparametrically 
by inverting the equilibrium choice probabilities. Thus, we assume that the difference in net 
benefits among adopters and non–adopters stems only from their sustainable practices and 
control for all other firm characteristics that may lead to differences in net benefits.  
3.1. The Model 
Since companies are assumed to be rational decision makers, in each period they make 
sustainability decisions, which maximize their expected net benefits. There are alternative ways 
to conceptualize sustainability decisions. On the one hand, we can model companies’ 
sustainability decisions as the level of investment put into sustainability initiatives. On the other 
hand, we can model companies’ sustainability decisions as a discrete choice— whether 
companies decide to invest into sustainability or not. As researchers, we do not know whether 
companies approach sustainability decisions as continuous or one – shot decisions.  
If the sustainability decisions are defined as continuous sustainability investments wi for 
company i, then the set of all possible decisions of the focal company and competitors becomes 
infinitely big and the estimation becomes computationally costly. Thus, we develop the 
following discrete choice model10, where each player simultaneously chooses an 
action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜖𝜖 {0,1}. 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �
1 if 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 > 0
         
 0 otherwise,
        (1) 
We assume that there are a finite number of companies (players); N={1, … , 𝑖𝑖, . . ,𝑛𝑛}. Let 
𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁 = �𝑥𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛� denote the vector of actions taken by all players. Player i choses an 
action  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 by taking the actions of competitors into account. 𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 = �𝑥𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛� 
denotes the vector of actions for all players, excluding player i. Let 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = (𝑠𝑠1, … . . , 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘) denote 
the vector of k state variables for player i and 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 ∈  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  denote the lth state variable for player i. 
The state variables in 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 may include variables such as firm size, firm age, leverage, R&D 
intensity and advertisement intensity as well as past sustainability decisions of the players, 
which are the variables that may affect the current decision on sustainability besides the 
strategic interaction. 𝑺𝑺 = (𝑆𝑆1, … . . , 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛) denotes the vector of state variables for all n players. 𝝑𝝑 
is a (nx1) vector of parameters measuring the impact of S on the expected total net benefit. 
We assume that S is common knowledge to all players in the game as well as observable 
to the analyst. For each player there is also a k+1th state variable labeled 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), which is private 
information for the player and unobservable to the analyst. Thus, each player is subject to a 
stochastic preference shock 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  for each possible action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. These state variables are 
assumed as distributed identically and independently (i.i.d.) across all players and actions. 
Player i’s vector of stochastic preference shock 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖0, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖1) is distributed according to a joint 
distribution with some general density function, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖). Furthermore, 𝜺𝜺𝑵𝑵/𝒊𝒊 =
                                                          
10 In this model a company is considered as an entrant into the sustainability market if 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 > 0. The model can be 
extended to companies, which have taken substantial sustainability initiatives to enter the sustainability market. 
Then a company will be considered as an entrant if the sustainability investments 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  exceed a threshold value. 
 �𝜀𝜀1, … . , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖−1,𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖+1, … , 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛� denotes the vector of stochastic preference shock for all players, 
excluding player i. 
The player i’s problem is to maximize the expected net benefits subject to the 
competitors’ actions in each period. 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺;   𝝑𝝑� defines the total net benefit of company 
i given 𝑺𝑺. The player i solves  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
�𝐸𝐸 �π𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺;   𝝑𝝑� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)��      (2) 
Since 𝜺𝜺𝑵𝑵/𝒊𝒊 are private information of other players and not observable by the player i, 
the decision of player i does not depend on these shocks. Thus, player i’s decision rule ai is a 
function of (𝑺𝑺, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) only. 
Define 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) as 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) = ∫1{𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑺𝑺, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 1}𝑓𝑓( 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) )𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    (3) 
where 1{𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑺𝑺, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 1} is the indicator function that player i’s decision is 1 given the vector of 
state variables and stochastic preference shock (𝑺𝑺, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖).  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺)  is the probability that 
player i’ s decision is to invest in sustainability conditional on the state variables S, which are 
public information. We define the distribution of 𝒙𝒙𝑵𝑵 given S as 𝑃𝑃(𝒙𝒙𝑵𝑵|𝑺𝑺) = ∏ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
Next, we define 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺;  𝝑𝝑� as the net benefit for player i for choosing action 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  over all possible actions of other players and the preference shock received by player i by 
choosing that particular action. 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑 � = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑 �𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖),  (4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺� = ∏ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�𝑺𝑺�𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 . Since player i does not observe the private information 
shocks, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 for (𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖), player i’s beliefs about her opponents’ sustainability actions are captured 
by 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺�. Since all possible actions of other players are accounted for, the following 
relation represents the choice specific net benefit function, which is the deterministic part11 of 
the expected net benefit function: 
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺�    (5) 
Player i chooses action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1 over action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0, if the summation of choice specific 
net benefit function and the preference shock from choosing action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1 exceeds the 
summation of choice specific net benefit function and the preference shock from choosing 
action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0. For player i to invest in sustainability is optimal, if the following condition is 
satisfied: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖|Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1) > Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0)} (6) 
3.2.Parametrization of the Net Benefit Function 
We consider a static entry game, where the net benefit function of entering the sustainability 
market subject to the competitors’ sustainability decisions is composed of two parts. In the first 
term in (7) 𝝑𝝑 measures the influence of state variables 𝐒𝐒′on the total net benefit 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 , 𝑺𝑺� 
—the conditions that lead the company to adopt sustainability, while the term 𝛿𝛿 captures the 
influence of other companies’ choices on the entry decision.12  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 , 𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑� =  �
𝝑𝝑𝐒𝐒′ + 𝛿𝛿�∑ 1�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗 �                         if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1
0                                                                       if  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0 
  (7)13 
                                                          
11 The net benefit of player i depending on each possible action taken by the competitors is multiplied by its 
probability of occurring, and the resulting products are summed to produce the expected value. Thus, the expected 
value of the random variable net benefit 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) can be calculated. 
12While S denotes the vector of state variables in the first stage, 𝑺𝑺′ denotes the vector of state variables S with the 
inclusion of a market– specific component in the second stage.  
13 Entry into the sustainability market is not an entry game in the classical sense, and hence staying in the no 
sustainability state does not necessarily lead to a zero payoff. However, as explained in section 3.3. in detail we 
won’t be able to identify the net benefit from investing into sustainability and staying in the no sustainability state 
separately. We can identify the difference between the net benefit of investing in sustainability as opposed to not 
investing. Thus, we assume that the net benefit of not investing in sustainability is equal to zero. 
 
According to Bajari et al. (2010) 𝛿𝛿 <0, since entry of a competitor into the market 
decreases the net benefit of the focal company i. However, for sustainability interactions the 
parameter 𝛿𝛿 in (7) depends on both the competition level and the spillover rate.  
The random error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) in the net benefit function (4) capture the preference 
shock to the net benefit from choosing action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, which are private information to player i. 
Player i’s error vector 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖0, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖1) is distributed jointly with a density function 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) and the 
random error terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid). We assume 
that the error terms are distributed extreme value. If 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) has an extreme value type– I 
distribution and the 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙’s are independent, then 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) has an analytical solution, which 
represents the probability of choosing 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1.  
The type–I extreme value distribution has common applications in the study of discrete 
choice behavior due to its analytical properties14 and empirical implications15 (McFadden, 
1984) and the following relation is well developed and conventionally used as the analytical 
solution to 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) =
exp (𝝑𝝑𝐒𝐒′+𝛿𝛿∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑺𝑺� )         𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗
1+exp ((𝝑𝝑𝐒𝐒′+𝛿𝛿∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑺𝑺� )         𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗
= Γ𝑖𝑖�𝝑𝝑, 𝛿𝛿,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗(1|𝑺𝑺),∀𝑗𝑗�.        (8) 
If we use equation (8) in equation (5), we get 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) = 𝜗𝜗𝑺𝑺′ +
𝛿𝛿 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 1�𝑺𝑺�.𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗   Since, the error terms are distributed extreme value, from equation (6), 
we infer that the choice probabilities 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) take a form similar to a single agent 
multinomial logit model. Since better actions are more likely to be chosen than worse actions, 
the statistical reaction function Γ𝑖𝑖�𝝑𝝑, 𝛿𝛿,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗(1|𝑺𝑺),∀𝑗𝑗� orders the probability of different actions 
by their expected net benefits. Thus, the reaction function is continuous and monotonically 
                                                          
14 The limiting distributions for the minimum or the maximum of a very large collection of random observations 
from the same arbitrary distribution can only be described by generalized extreme value distributions models —
specifically, the Gumbel, Fréchet, and Weibull distributions also known as type I, II and III extreme value 
distributions. 
15The difference of two type–I extreme value distributed variables follows a logistic distribution, of which the logit 
function is the quantile function. 
increasing in the choice specific net benefit function 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖. Since the error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 have density 
function 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is continous in Π𝑖𝑖, according to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem there is 
an equilibrium to this model for any finite S (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). We will use the 
equilibrium in equation (8) in the econometric analysis. 
We suppose that t=1,…,T repetitions of the game are observable and denote the 
sustainability decision of firm i in repetition t as 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Furthermore, we use 𝑺𝑺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for the values 
state variables take in period t such that 𝑺𝑺𝑖𝑖 = {𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖 … 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖} and follow a multi– stage estimation 
strategy. In the first stage, we estimate the binary response 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 conditional on a given set of 
covarites, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. By observing the sustainability decisions of large number of companies, we can 
obtain a consistent estimate  𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) for all i. A probit model suffices to 
estimate the choice probabilities in the first stage.  
In the second stage, we estimate the structural parameters of net benefit function 𝝑𝝑 and 
𝛿𝛿. Given the first stage estimates 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺), we maximize a pseudo–likelihood function 
Γ𝑖𝑖�𝝑𝝑, 𝛿𝛿,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗(1|𝑺𝑺),∀𝑗𝑗� and obtain estimates of 𝝑𝝑 and 𝛿𝛿 applying a logit model. On the one hand, 
this multi – stage estimation strategy has advantages in terms of computational burden, since 
we have to estimate a probit model in the first stage and a logit model in the second stage. On 
the other hand, a collinearity problem may arise when estimating 𝝑𝝑 and 𝛿𝛿, since both the first 
stage estimates  𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) and 𝜗𝜗𝐒𝐒′ depend on the vector of state variables S. In many 
settings, an exclusion restriction is imposed to overcome the collinearity problem. In this 
setting, the sustainability decisions of other firms do not directly affect company i’s net benefits. 
The endogenously determined actions of competitors indirectly enter the net benefit function 
of company i. If we exclude the shocks caused by other firms’ actions from the term 𝝑𝝑𝐒𝐒′, we 
will be able to eliminate collinearity. 
3.3. Identification 
We can identify the deterministic part of the net benefits, without imposing any assumptions 
on its functional form. Suppose we consider 𝝑𝝑 to be completely nonparametric, and hereinafter 
write 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺� instead of 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑�, and we denote the probability that the 
response is equal to one in the data conditional on 𝑺𝑺 as 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺), which corresponds to the 
probability of company i choosing to invest in sustainability. Similarly, we denote the 
probability that the response is equal to zero in the data conditional on 𝑺𝑺 as 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺), which 
corresponds to the probability of company i choosing not to invest in sustainability. Since even 
a single agent discrete choice model is not identified without independence and a parametric 
form assumption on the error term, we will assume that the error terms are distributed i.i.d. with 
a known distribution function and the error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) are distributed i.i.d. across actions 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
and players i. Moreover, the parametric form of the distribution, F, comes from a known family. 
We define Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) = 0 and Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) = 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺)), where 𝐹𝐹−1 denotes the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf). Analogous to the notation in the previous section, we 
define the deterministic part of the expected net benefit function as the choice specific net 
benefit function Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺)=∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺) 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺�.  
Company i chooses action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1 if and only if the choice specific net benefit and the 
error term associated with this action is greater than the choice specific net benefit and the error 
term associated with action 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0. Thus, the equilibrium in this model satisfies player i’s 
decision rule 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑺𝑺, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 1 if and only if 
 Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1) > Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0)    (9) 
Furthermore, the equilibrium choice probabilities 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) have to satisfy: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) > 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0) − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1)} (10) 
From Equation (10) we can infer that the equilibrium choice probabilities  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) have 
a one–to–one relationship to the choice specific net benefit functions, Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) −
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺). Since we assume that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) are distributed iid and the distribution comes from 
a known family, one–to–one mapping is possible. We denote the map from general form choice 
specific value functions to choice probabilities as: Γ: {0,1} 𝑥𝑥 𝑺𝑺 → [0,1]. 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) =  Γ𝑖𝑖(Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺))    (11) 
We denote the inverse mapping as Γ−1: 
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) = Γ𝑖𝑖−1( 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺))    (12) 
We can recover Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺)  nonparametrically by inverting the 
equilibrium choice probabilities. We identify the difference between the net benefit of investing 
in sustainability as opposed to not investing. We won’t be able to identify Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) and 
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) separately. Thus, we will assume that the net benefit of not investing in 
sustainability is equal to zero. Formally written for all i and 𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 and 𝑺𝑺, Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑺𝑺)=0.  
Based on this assumption using the mapping given in equation (13) we can recover 
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) for all 𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  and S. Recall that the definition of choice specific net benefit Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑺𝑺;𝝑𝝑) 
from (5) implies that 
Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) =  ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 ,𝑺𝑺) 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖  𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 �𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺� ∀𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛,  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0,1 (13) 
However, even if we knew Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) and 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖�𝑺𝑺� we would not be able to invert 
this system and identify the total net benefit π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑺𝑺). For the identification we follow 
Bajari et al. (2010) and introduce exclusion restrictions. Basically, we partition the state 
variables as: 𝑺𝑺 = (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑺𝑺𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖), which makes sense in terms of the conceptual model as well, since 
players have different state variables. As stated in Theorem 1 by Bajari et. al (2010) 
identification is achieved under the stated conditions therein. For details of the identification 
see Appendix. 
We will use the empirical analog of (13) to form an estimate of the total net benefit 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,   𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). If there is a nonparametric inversion between choice probabilities and the 
choice specific net benefit function, we can recover the estimates of the choice probabilities 
𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖  (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) and of the choice specific net benefit function Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺). The structural 
parameters of the model can be identified, if appropriate exclusion restrictions are imposed on 
the net benefits. In the next section, we describe the data and econometric specifications used 
to analyze the sustainability decisions of companies. 
3.4. Estimation 
Estimation of the model parameters is conducted in 3 steps. In the first step, the empirical 
counterpart of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺)  is estimated conditional on the firm’s own characteristics. In the 
second step, all other 𝑁𝑁 − 1 firms’ entry probabilities are plugged into the calculation of 
expected net benefit function for firm 𝑖𝑖 (the empirical counterpart of equation 5). In the 
empirical specification, this translates into as such one of the variables in the estimation of entry 
probability is the sum of the other firms’ entry probabilities since the net benefit function is 
additively linear in the entry decisions of other firms and other state variables as described in 
equation 7. Ideally at this stage, the probabilities estimated from equation 6 are required to be 
iterated to find the fixed point of the equation system. However, since we rely on the estimated 
first stage probabilities from the empirical counterpart of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺), we iterated twice to get 
the firm entry probabilities from equation 616. Finally, in the third step we estimated the model 
structural parameters that gives us the effect of competition on the firm’s entry decision.  
 
4. Data and Variables 
4.1. Data 
We have collected annual company data on corporate sustainability and corporate financial 
performance for years 1991–2014. We used social performance ratings from MSCI KLD 400 
Social Index database as the sustainability measure. 17 MSCI KLD 400 Social Index considers 
                                                          
16 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this. In the earlier version of the paper, probabilities were 
calculated using just the estimates from the first stage. 
17 https://www.msci.com/resources/factsheets/index_fact_sheet/msci-kld-400-social-index.pdf 
large, mid and small cap companies in the MSCI US IMI Index. MSCI KLD 400 Social Index 
rate companies in seven categories: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights and product. We extracted sustainability ratings of 4613 
companies between 1991 and 2013.  
We collected company financial information from the Wharton Research Data Services’ 
COMPUSTAT dataset. We focused on the North American sample of COMPUSTAT. We 
obtained 12,458 firm–year observations, after the companies with revenues less than 50 million 
USD are dropped. We extracted total assets; total stockholders’ equity, revenue, net sales, net 
income, and market value for 2,371 companies between the fiscal years 1991 and 2013.  
Out of 2371 companies 657 companies are both in the COMPUSTAT and the MSCI 
KLD 400 Social Index data sets. Thus, we obtained an unbalanced panel of 657 companies over 
the years 1991–2014. We excluded companies with roa≤-2 and roa≥2 so that outliers do not 
contaminate the results. We restricted the sample by excluding companies with leverage>2 over 
the sample period. We further restricted the sample between the years 1999-2014 to ensure the 
continuity of the time series.  
COMPUSTAT provides Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code information on 
the primary line of business for each firm. Since sustainability initiatives are industry specific, 
a comparison of companies in different industries such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 
mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance, and real 
estate and services is not adequate. Besides sector specific sustainability practices financial 
institutions have idiosyncratic financial reporting practices, which further complicates a 
comparison of the companies. We restricted the sample to manufacturing firms to ensure that 
the companies in the sample are comparable in terms of sustainability and financial 
performance and operationalized subindustry by using the two digits SIC codes. 
We obtained a balanced panel of 587 manufacturing companies over the years 1999-
2014. Since the data for the independent and dependent variables are collected from two 
completely different sources, common method bias does not affect the analysis. 
4.2.Variables 
We need to evaluate the influence of competition and spillover on the likelihood of entering the 
sustainability market. We assume that companies which are graded by MSCI KLD 400 Social 
Index have decided to enter the sustainability market and construct a binary variable, which is 
denoted as entry and is the empirical equivalent of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 
Since not all sustainability initiatives are independent from the industry characteristics, 
we can deduce that competition level regarding sustainability might be influenced indirectly by 
the competition level in the goods or/ and services market. We operationalize the sustainability 
competition as the number of companies in MSCI KLD 400 Social Index for given industry 
and year, whereas the company itself is excluded. We denote the variable as 
number_of_competitors, which corresponds to   𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖 in the empirical model.  
Since past sustainability decisions, firm size, financial performance, R&D intensity and 
advertising intensity can influence the sustainability decisions of the companies, we consider 
them as control variables. These control variables are the empirical counter part of the set of k 
state variables, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = (𝑠𝑠1, … . . , 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘),∀𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛. We incorporate past years’ sustainability 
decision and denote the variable as past_entry. Furthermore, we control whether or not a 
company enters the sustainability market for the first time. We denote the related variable as 
first_time_entry. 
We also include company size into the analysis as a control variable. To be able to 
compare companies which are in labor intensive versus capital/technology intensive industries, 
we consider the variables; number of employees, total revenue in million dollars and total 
assets. Due to missing values in the data, adding the control variable, natural logarithm of the 
number of employees into the analysis decreases the sample size and does not improve model 
fit. Thus, we omit this control variable from the final analysis. Since the total assets and total 
revenue are skewed to right, we use the natural logarithm and denote the variables as ln_asset 
and ln_revenue. 
There is a reciprocal relationship between sustainability performance and financial 
performance. While RBV and stakeholder theory advocate that sustainability, performance 
affects financial performance positively, the slack resources theory supports the recursive 
relationship (Waddock et al. 1997). Firms that financially outperform their industry average 
have slack resources to invest in corporate sustainability activities (Surroca, Tribo, and 
Waddock 2010). To isolate the influence of slack resources and control for financial 
performance we employ leverage and return on assets as indicators of financial performance. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets and the related variable is denoted as leverage. Return 
on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets and the variable is denoted as roa. 
Furthermore, since we aim to evaluate the influence of sustainability on financial 
performance from the stakeholder theory channel, we isolate the effect of advertisement on 
stakeholder returns and include advertising intensity as a control variable. In the context of 
sustainability research, RBV suggests that corporate sustainability initiatives are intangible 
resources of the firm, which promote efficiency and lead to better financial performance. To 
isolate sustainability from other intangible resources of the firm we control for R&D intensity, 
as an intangible resource. Due to missing values in the data adding the control variables 
advertising intensity and R&D intensity into the analysis decreases the sample size. Since 
qualitatively similar results were found for this data set, we do not report these results in the 
interest of brevity and exclude the control variables advertising intensity and R&D intensity 
from the final analysis reported in Section 5. 
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for entry into sustainability market (entry), past entry 
into sustainability market (past_entry), first time entry into sustainability market 
(first_time_entry), firm size (ln_asset, ln_revenue), financial performance (roa, leverage), 
market share of the company (market_share) and market size of the industry (market_size). 
About 41.18 % of the companies in our dataset are identified as invested in sustainability at 
least once between 1999 and 2014. 37.59 % of the companies are first time entrants into the 
sustainability market. The average roa is 0.1216 %. Thus, financially good companies are not 
overrepresented in the sample, which might have prompted misleading results. The average 
market share in the data is 3.4 %, which indicates that the market is highly fragmented. We can 
infer that the sustainability market is a highly competitive market. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
5.1. Evidence for Causality 
Since the dependent variable entry take only two values, ‘1’and ‘0’, which represent outcomes 
invest/ not invest in sustainability initiatives, we assume that the net benefits come from a binary 
logit model, where the probability of a particular outcome is determined as follows: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Γ𝑖𝑖 �𝝑𝝑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖� 𝑺𝑺𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖��   (14) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 0) = 1 − Γ𝑖𝑖 �𝝑𝝑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸�𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖� 𝑺𝑺𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖��  
In all the estimations in Table 2, the dependent variable entry indicates whether a 
company has entered the sustainability market or not. The explanatory variable 
number_of_competitors is calculated as the number of companies that entered the sustainability 
market, whereas the focal company is excluded. In Model 1, we include the control variables 
past entry, ln_asset, ln_revenue, roa, leverage, market share and first time entry. In Model 2, 
we control for the time trend effects by incorporating time variant variables in addition to the 
full set of controls. We calculate trend as the difference between the year of observation and 
1998. We include the variable trend2, the squared trend, thereby allowing a nonlinear 
relationship between time trend effects and entry. In Model 3, we run a random effects model, 
since the differences across companies might have some influence on the dependent variable 
entry. We incorporate the full set of controls as well as trend and trend2. Thereby we control 
both for individual and time trend effects. In Model 4, we restrict the sample to companies that 
enter the sustainability market for the first time and control for trend and trend2, ln_asset, 
ln_revenue, roa, leverage and market share. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
 
For all specifications, we can infer that if more competitors enter the sustainability 
market the likelihood of the focal company entering the sustainability market will increase. This 
finding suggests that the spillover effects dominate the competition effect. However, it is not 
clear whether the spillover effects stem from the demand or supply side. As discussed in Section 
2, spillovers may occur in form of improved stakeholder perception of the whole industry and 
all players in the industry benefit from increased demand or the implementation cost is lower 
for companies that imitate the competitors’ sustainability initiatives. Either way the companies 
benefit from the spillovers without bearing the full cost of the investments, thus the likelihood 
of entering in the sustainability market increases compared to the likelihood of entering in a 
sustainability market, where no spillovers exists.  
Nonetheless, this finding suggests that companies are more likely to invest into 
sustainability if they observe that their competitors invest into sustainability and supports that 
sustainability becomes the norm over course of time like any other innovation or disruptive 
technology. This finding is consistent with the ‘sustainability dissemination’ (Matisoff 2015) 
or ‘green domino effect’ (Unruh 2010). However, to measure the casual effect of competition, 
we need to assure that the coefficient of the number_of_competitors is an unbiased estimator 
of sustainability competition. 
5.2. Correcting for Endogeneity Bias with IV Model 
The analysis in Table 2 does not indicate a causal relationship. In other words, we do not 
observe the likelihood of a company entering the sustainability market, if all else being equal, 
N+1 companies compete in the sustainability market instead of N companies. Thus, the models 
in Table 2 do not provide a measure of the causal effect of competition on the entry decision 
into the sustainability market. They rather exhibit an association between the number of 
competitors and the likelihood of entry in the sustainability market. 
To control for the endogeneity in the relationship, the IV method can be used. If there 
is an observable instrument, that affects sustainability decisions of competitors, but is 
uncorrelated with the unobserved factor affecting the sustainability decision of the focal 
company, then an IV estimator based on this instrument will yield a consistent estimate of the 
number of competitors on the likelihood of entering into the sustainability market. Assuming 
the number of competitors in the market is fixed, an increase in the industry size would increase 
the expected revenue, which makes the entry of the focal company into the market more likely. 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a; 1991b) note that market size is highly correlated with the number 
of firms in a market. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) use market size as an instrument for the 
number of firms. We employ the natural logarithm of total market revenue (market_size) as a 
measure of industry size and use it as an instrument. This IV measure, though may not be the 
ideal instrument, still has the potential to correct some of the endogeneity in the relationship.18 
                                                          
18 The first stage of the IV estimates indicates a significant association between the number of competitors and the 
market size variables. The corresponding F–statistics is significantly high.  Also, the Wald test of exogeneity 
employed produces 4.95 for the chi–squared (1) with the corresponding p–value of 0.026. 
In table 3 we employ market_size as a measure of industry size and use it as an 
instrument. This estimation is presented in column 2 in Table 3. In column 1, we restate the 
result with endogeneity. We see from the results; in the IV specification the coefficient of the 
competition is not positive and significant as the logit estimation suggested. The negative and 
significant relationship between the likelihood of entry and number of competitors indicates 
that the effect of competition dominates spillover effects. The first stage of the IV estimate 
indicates a significant association between the number of competitors and the market size 
variables. The corresponding F-statistics is significantly high. Also, the Wald test of exogeneity 
employed for IV produce 17.07 for the chi-squared (1) with the corresponding p-values of 
0.000. 
Since the focal company makes the entry decision conditional on the actions of its 
competitors, if the unobserved factor affects the sustainability decision of the focal company as 
well as the sustainability decisions of its competitors positively, then the coefficient of the 
number_of_competitors will be upward biased. As seen in Table 3, when the IV approach is 
implemented19, the coefficient of the explanatory variable, which is significant and positive in 
Model 2, becomes negative and significant. We interpret this result as an evidence of 
endogeneity in the logit results and therefore the true coefficient can be in fact negative. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Compared to Model 2 in Table 3, the IV result indicates that the coefficient has a negative sign 
as the literature would suggest about the effect of competition. The endogeneity due to the 
strategic interactions leads to the upward biased in the logit estimates, and we obtain the positive 
                                                          
19 In Stata IV–probit is implemented where the variable number_of_competitors is instrumented with the market 
revenue. 
coefficients in Table 2. To further investigate the endogeneity in the estimation we therefore 
need to incorporate the strategic interaction into the analysis. 
5.3.Correcting for Endogeneity Bias with Static Model of Strategic Interaction 
We assume static competition and employ the multi – stage analysis described in Section 3. We 
take the estimates of the equilibrium choice probabilities 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) from the first stage as given 
and form an estimate of the choice specific net benefit function Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺). 
This can be done by evaluating equation (10) using 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) instead of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺). In the case of 
the binary logit model the inversion follows as: 
Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺) − Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺) = log (𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑺𝑺)) − log (𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺)) (15) 
under the assumption that the preference shock has an extreme value type I distribution. We 
need covariates that influence the net benefits of a particular company, but not other 
companies.20 The covariates include past sustainability performance (past_entry, 
first_time_entry), firm size (ln_assets, ln_revenue)  and  financial performance (roa, leverage).  
We obtain consistent estimates of the probabilities in the first stage. After recovering 
the estimate of 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|𝑺𝑺) and estimate of choice specific net benefit function Π�𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑺𝑺), we 
use the empirical analog of equation (11) to form an estimate of Π𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,   𝒙𝒙𝑁𝑁/𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) and recover 
structural parameters. We iterate twice to get the firm entry probabilities The identification 
depends crucially on applying appropriate exclusion restrictions. The recovered probabilities 
are plugged into third step incorporating the competitive interaction which is operationalized 
as market_share. Thereby, we estimate the causal effect of competition on the likelihood of 
entry in the sustainability market consistently.  
                                                          
20 In general, this is not required for the model identification but incorporating an extra variable into the estimation, 
that supplies independent variation for each company will make the identification easier. Otherwise the model is 
identified depending on a functional form. 
 
As discussed in Section 2 increasing competition decreases the likelihood of investing 
in sustainability and will manifest itself as a negative and significant coefficient. However, due 
to the spillovers, the effect of increasing competition on net benefits is not that clear. Spillovers 
occur in the form of 1) decreased initial investment costs due to imitability of sustainability 
investments, which are generally not protected by patents and 2) improved stakeholder 
perception towards the whole industry, which results in increased revenues. Regardless of the 
channel —revenue increase or cost reduction —spillovers increase the expected net benefits, 
which in turn increases the likelihood of entry. If the spillover effect dominates the competition 
effect, we expect to obtain positive and significant coefficients. 
In Table 4, the results of the three-step estimation are presented. We control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in several ways. First, in all specifications, we include a full set of 
firm and year fixed effects to control for factors that remain fixed in a year that influence 
sustainability decisions of companies. Second, we control for unobserved heterogeneity using 
both fixed effects and random effects specifications. When we substitute the recovered 
probabilities into the third step, we observe that the coefficient of the explanatory variable is 
negative and significant. Recall that, it is positive and significant in the logit estimation (Table 
2) and negative and significant in the IV estimation (Table 3). While the IV estimation corrects 
for the endogeneity bias to some extent, incorporating strategic interactions yield unbiased 
results. The negative and significant relationship between the likelihood of entry and number 
of competitors indicates that the effect of competition dominates spillover effects.  
As proposed in Section 2, competition increases the cost of market entry, while spillover 
effects decrease these costs. Since sustainability initiatives, which are easy to implement are 
prone to disseminate to all market participants, we would observe the effect of spillovers if it 
were substantial. The comparison of Table 4 to Table 2 verifies that employing 
number_of_competitors as explanatory variable leads to upward biased results. Thus, 
considering the effect of competition and spillovers as ex ante measures of market entry 
becomes important. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
 
According to the bandwagon effect companies see sustainability investments as 
necessity due to market share even though they might not benefit financially in the short term. 
Lourenco et al. (2012) present empirical evidence that if firms with a lower level of 
sustainability are profitable, market penalizes larger firms more. Managerial implication of this 
finding is that companies do not invest in sustainability out of necessity. Cassimon, Engelen, 
and Van Liedekerke (2016) point out that companies relying solely on the net present value or 
cost–benefit approach, which ignore the strategic value of sustainability investments, often 
decide not to invest into sustainability. We observe a negative effect of number of competitors 
on the likelihood of entry only when controlled for strategic interactions and infer that for 
sustainability innovations the bandwagon effect is supported.  
We document that market share influences the likelihood of entry into the sustainability 
market negatively. According to Hofer, Cantor, and Dai (2012) more productive companies see 
less a need to invest in sustainability to gain superior financial performance. Soytaş, Denizel, 
and Uşar (2019) present empirical evidence that more productive firms have higher marginal 
costs of sustainability and point out it is costlier for productive companies to change, since the 
way operate is well established. Similarly, companies which have established market share are 
likely to see less a need to invest in sustainability. 
We document that first – time entry into sustainability decreases the likelihood of entry, 
hence we infer that initial sustainability investments are costly due to competition. As seen in 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 the variable past_entry increases the likelihood of entry, 
whereas the variable first_time_ entry decreases the likelihood of entry. Moreover, we refine 
our analysis by restricting our sample to the companies which enter for the first time. The 
change in the coefficient in Model 4 reveals that the first – time entry of a company decreases 
the likelihood of entry at a noticeably, which suggests that initial investments are costly and act 
as market entry barriers. This finding it is consistent with the corporate immune system concept 
in corporate entrepreneurship literature (Birkinshaw et al. 1999) and Eccles, Ioannou, and 
Serafeim (2014) remark on corporate inertia in the strategy literature. 
Entry decision into the sustainability market is a strategic decision and creates selection 
bias. As seen in Table 2 due to selection bias, the results are biased upwards and overestimate 
the true relationship between number of competitors and likelihood of entry. The multi– stage 
model intents to correct the selection bias and we document that the number of competitors 
affect the likelihood of entry negatively. However, a limitation of multi– stage models is that 
the researchers might be over–controlling for differences across firms by controlling for the 
likelihood to invest into sustainability and then only examining within–firm changes over time, 
which might lead to incorrect negative or insignificant findings (Matisoff 2015). To show that 
over–controlling is not a concern, we perform robustness check. 
5.4. Robustness 
We allow for a more flexible first stage, to evaluate whether the presence of competition effect 
is robust. We replicate the estimations in Model1 to Model4 in Table 4, using the probabilities 
recovered from a semiparametric first stage instead of the parametric first stage used in the main 
estimation and estimate the same effect for the specifications in Table 5. The results indicate a 
robust negative relationship between competition and the likelihood of entry into the 
sustainability market. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigated how a game–theoretic framework can aid in the construction and 
estimation of interrelated choice models in the corporate sustainability context. The first 
contribution of this paper consists of presenting a new coherent econometric model that 
incorporates the possibility of the competitors’ actions having an impact on the sustainability 
decision of the focal company. Like classical industrial organization research, we have explored 
how the number of firms in the sustainability market, firms’ sizes, their financial positions, and 
potential competitors affect market entry. When strategic interactions are not accounted for, we 
find that the increase in the number of competitors rises the likelihood of sustainability 
investments, seemingly shows the spillover effect dominates the competition. However, when 
we control for the strategic interaction of sustainability, the relationship between number of 
competitors and the likelihood of entry into the sustainability market becomes negative. As the 
second contribution, we applied a multi – stage estimation approach, which incorporates 
competitive interaction structurally into the estimation and document that competition hurts the 
likelihood of entry into the sustainability market. Our analysis demonstrates that using the 
number of competitors as a measure for competition without controlling for the strategic 
interactions does not capture the pure competition effect.  Instead it captures an effect that is 
contaminated with both competition and spillover, i.e. endogeneity due to the strategic 
interactions shadows the coefficient estimate of competition and produces an upward biased 
coefficient if strategic interactions are not controlled. With the multi- stage estimation 
framework only, this ‘causal’ effect of competition in the sustainability market can be 
estimated. The results demonstrate that our findings are aligned with the conventional effect of 
competition on market entry. 
The practical contribution of this research is to understand how strategic interactions of 
firms’ sustainability decisions affect the overall sustainable initiatives. This new game theoretic 
formulation incorporates competition through strategic interactions where a novel model with 
the firm sustainability activities are viewed as a market entry game. In this setup, single firm’s 
entrance to the sustainability market is rewarded as a function of the other firms’ sustainability 
decisions. With this new view, companies’ sustainability decisions are not only based on the 
isolated cost benefit analysis but also are affected by the sustainability decisions of competitor 
companies. Firms might decide to invest in sustainability to gain competitive advantage in the 
long–term regardless of the financial return in the short–term. We believe modelling 
sustainability decisions as market entry decisions, and therefore conceptualizing sustainability 
as a ‘market’ has the potential to contribute to the growing literature on sustainability and 
modeling the strategic interactions between the firms. In fact, a way to promote sustainability 
is by undertaking market wide policies to curb negative effect of competition rather than 
focusing on individual firms that are lagging in their sustainability performance.  
We provided empirical evidence that the effect of competition on the likelihood of entry 
into the sustainability market dominates the effect of spillover. Furthermore, this finding is 
more profound for the first–time entrants. Classical industrial organization research has well 
established that in the case of fierce competition it is more beneficial for companies to resort to 
product differentiation instead of price regulation (Motta, 2004). Similarly, in the sustainability 
market companies have to differentiate their sustainability initiatives. This study encourages 
companies to invest in sustainability investments that are unique to them such as process 
improvements instead of easily imitable initiatives with high spillover effects. An implication 
of this result to production researchers is that they should address how companies can make 
unique product and process changes to incorporate sustainability in their production activities. 
This will not only increase sustainability performance of companies, but it will also help them 
be more competitive. 
This result also has substantial regulatory policy implications for production 
sustainability outcomes where the market regulator influences the cost. Based on the 
assumption that policy makers would aim to increase the sustainability outputs of the entire 
sector, they will be expected to support initiatives that will transform the whole sector. 
However, there may be resistance from companies to invest in such sustainability investments. 
For this reason, public policy makers should consider giving incentives to companies to 
compensate the negative influence of competition on the total sustainability outcome of the 
market. Therefore, higher sustainability outcome without increasing the cost just can be 
achieved by market-based policies targeted correctly.  In addition, policy makers should arrange 
incentives for first-time entrants, so that they can overcome market entry barriers imposed by 
incumbent firms. 
This study has some limitations, as with any study. We model firms’ sustainability 
decisions as static decisions; our econometric estimation assumes the market entry game is 
played only once. Whether the strategic decisions of firms related to sustainability are better 
modelled as static or dynamic decisions is debatable. The past decisions of the firms are 
important determinants of the current decisions, however whether this dependence qualifies for 
a path to model the process as a dynamic process is an open research question. Thus, future 
research questions arise such as the formalization of sustainability interactions in a multi period 
model since investments in sustainability might have dynamic effects over time, which the static 
model does not capture. Moreover, the decomposition of latent profits into revenue and costs 
components would provide a better understanding of how strategic interactions influence the 
sustainability decisions and what kind of sustainable actions lead to superior financial 
outcomes. Furthermore, we have modelled the strategic sustainability interactions from a non-
cooperative viewpoint, however the sustainability decisions of companies are also heavily 
affected from the supply chain partners. For future research, there is a need to develop an 
integrated model which incorporates both the effect of competitors and supply chain partners. 
However, this is not an easy task since supply chains have become intertwined and an upstream 
supplier can be both a supplier and a competitor to the focal company (Dolgui et al. 2020). We 
believe that strategic sustainability interactions have high potential for further exploration and 
conceptualizing sustainability decisions as market entry decisions creates a potential tool to 
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